Beyond Oaxaca-Blinder: Accounting for Differences in Household Income Distributions Across Countries by Bourguignon, François et al.
 
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Oaxaca-Blinder: Accounting for Differences in 
Household Income Distributions Across Countries 
 
 
By: François Bourguignon, Francisco H. G. Ferreira 
and Phillippe G. Leite 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 478 
February 2002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Oaxaca-Blinder: Accounting for Differences in Household 
Income Distributions Across Countries  
 
François Bourguignon, Francisco H. G. Ferreira and Phillippe G. Leite
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Inequality, Distribution, Micro-simulations 
 
JEL Classification Codes: C15, D31, I31, J13, J22 
 
Abstract: This paper develops a micro-econometric method to account for differences 
across distributions of household income. Going beyond the determination of earnings in 
labor markets, we also estimate statistical models for occupational choice and for the 
conditional distributions of education, fertility and non-labor incomes. We import 
combinations of estimated parameters from these models to simulate counterfactual income 
distributions. This allows us to decompose differences between functionals of two income 
distributions (such as inequality or poverty measures) into shares due to differences in the 
structure of labor market returns (price effects); differences in the occupational structure; 
and differences in the underlying distribution of assets (endowment effects). We apply the 
method to the differences between the Brazilian income distribution and those of the United 
States and Mexico, and find that most of Brazil's excess income inequality is due to 
underlying inequalities in the distribution of two key endowments: access to education and 
to sources of non-labor income, mainly pensions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The distribution of personal welfare varies enormously across countries. The Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of household per capita incomes, for instance, ranges from 
0.20 in the Slovak Republic to 0.63 in Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2002) and similar (or 
greater) international variation can be found for any alternative measure of inequality. 
Given that inequality levels within countries are generally rather stable, one would think 
that there ought to be considerable interest in understanding why income distributions vary 
so much across countries. Is it because the underlying distributions of wealth differ greatly, 
perhaps due to historical reasons? Or is it because returns to education are higher in one 
country than in the other? What is the role of differences in labor market institutions? Do 
different fertility rates and family structures play a role? And if, as is likely, differences in 
income distributions reflect all of these (and possibly other) factors, in what manner and to 
what extent does each one contribute? 
 
Yet, applied research on differences across income distribution has not been as abundant as 
one might expect.
2 Increasingly, this seems to have less to do with lack of data and more to 
do with inadequate methodological tools. Through initiatives like the Luxembourg Income 
Study, the WIDER International Income Distribution Dataset and others, the availability of 
high-quality household-level data is growing. Methodologically, however, those seeking an 
understanding of why distributions are so different - and reluctant to rely exclusively on 
cross-country regressions with inequality measures as dependent variables - have often 
resorted to comparing Theil decompositions across countries.
3 We will argue below that, 
while these can be informative, their ability to shed light on determinants of differences 
across distributions is inherently limited. 
 
Meanwhile, substantial progress has been made in our ability to understand differences in 
wage (or earnings) distributions. Some of this work, such as Almeida dos Reis and Paes de 
                                                           
2 Theoretical models of why income distributions might differ across countries have been more abundant. 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Bénabou (2000) are two well-known examples. See Aghion et. al. (1999) 
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Barros (1991), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Blau and Khan (1996) and Machado and 
Mata (2001), draws on variants of a decomposition technique based on simulating 
counterfactual distributions by combining data on individual characteristics (X) from one 
distribution, with estimated parameters (β ) from another, which is due originally to Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973).
4 Another strand, which includes DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996) and Donald, Green and Paarsch (2000), is based on alternative semi-parametric 
approaches. DiNardo et.al. (1996) use weighted kernel density estimators - instead of 
regression coefficients - to generate counterfactual density functions that combine 
population attributes (or labor market institutions) from one period, with the structure of 
returns from another.  Donald et. al. (2000) adapt hazard-function estimators from the spell-
duration literature to develop density-function estimators, and use these to construct 
counterfactual density and distribution functions (comparing the US and Canada).
5 
 
These approaches have been very fruitful, but they have not yet been generalized from 
wage distributions to those of household incomes, largely because the latter involve some 
additional complexities. The distribution of wages is defined over those currently 
employed. Taking the characteristics of these workers as given, earnings determination can 
be reasonably well understood by estimating returns to those characteristics in the labor 
market, through a Mincerian earnings equation:  i i i X y ε β + = . Most of the aforementioned 
recent literature on differences in wage inequality is based on simulating counterfactual 
distributions on the basis of equations such as this, and many further restrict their samples 
to include prime-age, full-time male workers only. In addition, some authors are quite clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Theil decompositions are known more formally as decompositions of Generalized Entropy inequality 
measures by population subgroups. They were developed independently by Bourguignon (1979), Cowell 
(1980) and Shorrocks (1980). 
4 Some of these studies, like Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Machado and Mata (2001) decompose 
changes in the wage distribution of a single country, over time. Others, like Almeida dos Reis and Paes de 
Barros (for metropolitan areas within Brazil) and Blau and Khan (for ten industrialized countries) decompose 
differences across wage distributions for different spatial units. For a less well known but also pioneering 
work, see Langoni (1973). 
5 The distinction between "parametric" and "semi-parametric" methods is not terribly sharp. DiNardo et. al. 
(1996) use a probit model to estimate one of their conditional reweighing functions. Donald et. al. (2000) rely 
entirely on maximum likelihood estimates of parameters in a proportional-hazards model, and what is non-
parametric about their method is a fine double-partitioning of the income space, allowing for considerable 
flexibility in both the estimation of the baseline hazard function, and in the manner in which it is shifted by 
the proportional-hazards estimates. Conversely, in the current paper, which follows a predominantly William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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that they are interested in wages primarily as indicators of the price of labor, rather than as 
measures of welfare. 
 
Naturally, the distribution of household incomes also depends on the returns and 
characteristics of its employed members, and will thus draw on earnings models too. But it 
also depends on their participation and occupational choices and on decisions concerning 
the size and composition of the family. In addition, changes in some personal 
characteristics, such as education, affect household incomes through more than one 
channel. Suppose we ask what the effect of “importing” the US distribution of education to 
Mexico is on the Mexican distributions of earnings and incomes. Whereas for earnings it 
might very well suffice to replace the relevant vector of X with US values, the distribution 
of household incomes will also be affected through changes in participation and fertility 
behavior. This greater complexity of the determinants of household income distributions 
seems to have prevented counterfactual simulation techniques from being applied to them, 
thus depriving those interested in understanding cross-country differences in the 
distribution of welfare from the powerful insights they can deliver. 
 
Nevertheless, a more general version of the Oaxaca-Blinder idea – of simulating 
counterfactual distributions on the basis of combining models estimated for different real 
distributions - can fruitfully be applied to household incomes. What is required is an 
expansion of the set of models to be estimated, to include labor market participation, 
fertility behavior and educational choices. In this paper, we first propose a general 
statement of statistical decompositions applied to household income distributions; and then 
suggest a specific model of household income determination that enables us to implement 
the decomposition empirically. In particular, we investigate the comparative roles of three 
factors: the distribution of population characteristics (or endowments); the structure of 
returns to these endowments, and the occupational structure of the population. We apply 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
parametric route, some non-parametric reweighing of joint distribution functions is also used (see below). 
These techniques are often more complementary than substitutable.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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the method to an understanding of the differences between the income distributions in 
Brazil, Mexico and the US.
 6  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes what can be learned from 
conventional comparisons of income distributions across these three countries, and presents 
an empirical motivation. Section 3 contains a general statement of statistical decomposition 
analysis, which encompasses all variants currently in use as special cases. Section 4 
proposes a specific model of household income determination and describes the estimation 
and simulation procedures needed for the decomposition. The results obtained in the case of 
the Brazil-US comparison are discussed in some detail in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the 
Brazil-Mexico comparison and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Income Distribution in Brazil, Mexico and the United States. 
 
This section compares the distributions of household income in the three most populous 
countries in the Western Hemisphere.
7 The comparisons are based on an analysis of the 
original household-level data sets: the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios 
(PNAD) 1999 is used for Brazil; the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares 
(ENIGH) 1994 for Mexico; and the Annual Demographic Survey in the March Supplement 
to the Current Population Survey (CPS) 2000, for the United States. As always with the 
March Supplement of the CPS, total personal income data refers to the preceding calendar 
year:1999. Sample sizes for each data set (actually used) are as follows: the CPS 2000 
contained 50,982 households (133,649 individuals); the ENIGH 1994 contained 6,614 
households (29,149 individuals); and the PNAD 1999 contained 80,972 households 
(294,244 individuals).  
 
                                                           
6 This approach is a cross-country extension of a methodology previously developed to analyze the dynamics 
of the distribution of income within a single country. See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998). 
7 Our emphasis here is purely comparative. We make no attempt to present a detailed analysis of inequality or 
poverty in each of these countries. There is a large literature on these topics for each of our three countries, 
but see Henriques (2000) for a recent compilation of work on Brazil, and Székely (1998) on Mexico. For 
earlier studies comparing the Brazilian and US earnings distributions, see Lam and Levison (1992) and 
Sacconato and Menezes-Filho (2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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We use income, rather than consumption, data because the decompositions described in the 
remainder of the paper rely in part on the determination of earnings.
8 In Brazil and Mexico, 
the income variable used was monthly total household income per capita, available in the 
surveys as a constructed variable from the disaggregated income questionnaire. In the US, 
the variable used was the sum (across individuals in the household) of annual total personal 
income and other incomes, excluding disability benefits, educational assistance and child 
support, divided by 12.
9 All three income definitions are before tax, but include transfers. 
While total annual incomes are not top-coded in the CPS, some of their components might 
be. The US Census Bureau warns that weekly earnings, in particular, are "subject to top-
coding at U$1923", so as to censor the distribution of annual earnings from the main job at 
U$100,000. Inspection of our sample revealed, however, that 2.1% (2.5%) of observations 
had reported weekly (annual) earnings above those value. The maximum reported weekly 
value was U$2884. We therefore did not correct for top-coding in the US. Incomes are not 
top-coded in Brazil or Mexico either. 
 
As usual, there are reasons to suspect that incomes may be measured with some error. In 
the case of Brazil, the problem is particularly severe in rural areas, to the extent that the 
usefulness of any estimate based on rural income data is thrown into doubt.
10 For this 
reason, we prefer to confine our attention to urban areas only, in Brazil and Mexico.
11 Care 
is taken to ensure that the distributions used are as comparable as possible, and this requires 
that we work with data unadjusted for misreporting, imputed rents, or for regional price 
level differences within countries.
 12  
 
                                                           
8 And also because consumption data for Brazil is either very old (ENDEF, 1975) or incomplete in 
geographical coverage (POF, 1996; PPV, 1996). 
9 These income sources were excluded from the analysis because non-retirement public transfers are 
proportionately much more important in the US than in Brazil or Mexico, and their allocation follows rules 
which are not modelled in our approach. When they were included, the residual term of the decomposition 
was slightly larger, but all of our conclusions remained qualitatively valid. 
10 For evidence on the weaknesses of income data for rural Brazil, see Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2000) and 
Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Leite (2001). 
11 For the US, since the CPS does not disaggregate non-metropolitan areas into urban and rural, and the 
former dominate, we included both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.    
12 All three datasets are well-known in their respective countries. For more detailed information about the 
CPS, go to www.census.gov. Information on the PNAD is available from www.ibge.gov.br. Information on 
the ENIGH is available from http://www.inegi.gob.mx/. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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Table 1 below reports some key summary statistics of the income distributions for our three 
countries. In addition to population, GDP per capita and mean income from the household 
survey, three inequality measures are computed: the Gini Coefficient, the Theil T and L 
indices –  in what follows, the last two are sometimes labeled E(1) and E(0), respectively, 
as members of the class of generalized entropy inequality measures. Each of these statistics 
is presented for the distribution of household income per capita, as well as for a distribution 
of equivalised incomes, where the Buhmann et. al. (θ  = 0.5) equivalence scale is used. 
13 
All households are weighted by the number of individuals they comprise. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Country Population 
(millions, 
1999)  
GDP per capita 
(monthly, USD) 
Mean equivalised 
income 
(monthly, USD) 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil-T Theil-L 
θ  = 1.0 (household income per capita) 
Brazil 168  526.42  290.34  0.587  0.693  0.646 
Mexico 97  643.25  280.90  0.536  0.580  0.511 
USA 273  2550.00  1691.64 0.445  0.349  0.391 
θ  = 0.5  
Brazil 168  526.42  551.08  0.560  0.613  0.572 
Mexico 97  643.25  587.91  0.493  0.478  0.423 
USA 273  2550.00  2791.78 0.415  0.298  0.344 
Notes: Population and GDP per capita figures are from World Bank (2001). The other figures are from calculations by 
the authors from the household surveys.  GDP per capita and mean equivalised income (MEY) are monthly and 
measured in 1999 US dollars at PPP exchange rates. Mexican survey data is for 1994; Brazilian survey data is for 
1999, and US survey data is for 2000. Values of θ  are for the economy of scale parameter in the Buhmann et.al. (1988) 
equivalence scale - θ  = 1 corresponds to income per capita.  
 
Similarities between Brazil (in 1999) and Mexico (in 1994) are immediately apparent. 
Across those different years, the two countries had broadly similar levels of GDP per 
capita. Mexico's was 22% higher than Brazil's , which pales in comparison to the difference 
between the two countries and the US: 384% higher than Brazil's. Brazil's inequality is 
ranked highest by all three measures reported, followed by Mexico and the United States. 
The difference between Brazil's and Mexico's Ginis, at approximately five points, is not too 
large, while there are a full fourteen points between Brazil and the US. It is interesting to 
note that the effect of allowing for (a good deal) of scale economies in household 
consumption differs across both countries and measures. Focusing on the Gini coefficient, 
                                                           
13 According to that method, the equivalised income of a household with income y and size N is taken to be 
y/N
θ .  This definition coincides with income per capita when θ =1. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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the reduction in inequality in Mexico from reducing θ  from 1.0 to 0.5 is larger than either in 
the US or Brazil. 
 
The considerable differences in both mean incomes and inequality across these three 
countries must translate into different poverty levels as well. Table 2 below presents the 
three standard FGT
14 poverty measures for each country, based on the distribution of per 
capita household incomes. The first panel shows poverty rates for the entire countries, 
whereas the second panel shows them for urban areas only, which is the universe for the 
analysis carried out in the next sections of the paper. In both cases, we use two alternative 
poverty thresholds. The first block in each panel employs an absolute poverty line, 
originally calculated as a strict indigence line for Brazil by Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri 
(2000). Translated to 1999 values, it was set at R$74.48, or US$83.69 at PPP exchange 
rates. Having the lowest mean and the highest inequality of the three countries, Brazil has 
the most poverty by all three measures, in urban areas and overall. The United States has, 
by this ungenerous developing country standards, only traces of poverty. As for Mexico, it 
is striking how much of its poverty is rural: poverty incidence falls from 23% nationally, to 
less than 7% in urban areas. While being mindful that urban-rural definitions vary across 
countries, it would seem that poverty has an even more predominantly rural profile in 
Mexico than in Brazil.  
 
But when one considers welfare across countries at such different levels of development 
and per capita income as these three countries, a strong argument can be made that a 
relative poverty concept might be more appropriate. For this reason we also present the 
same poverty measures, in the same distributions, calculated with respect to a line set at 
half the median income in each distribution, in the second block of each panel. By these 
more relative standards, poverty in the US reaches a full quarter of the population, which 
happens to be quite similar to Brazil's urban incidence. Mexico's P(0) also rises to 15% in 
urban areas. 
 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
  8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1, which contains the Lorenz curves for the urban household income distributions 
for Brazil, Mexico and the US, is a useful complement to the indices presented so far. 
Brazil is Lorenz dominated by both Mexico and the United States, whereas those two 
countries, at least with only urban Mexico being considered, can not be Lorenz ranked. The 
Atkinson Theorem  (1970) – which establishes the link between normalized second-order 
stochastic dominance and unambiguous inequality ranking - makes Lorenz Curves very 
useful diagrammatic tools to compare income distributions. Nevertheless, because they are 
two levels of integration above a density function, we can do even better in terms of 
picturing the distribution. Figure 2 below plots kernel estimates of the (mean normalized) 
density functions for the distribution of (the logarithm of) household per capita income in 
our three countries. The greater dispersion of the Brazilian distribution is noticeable with 
respect to the Mexican, as is the greater skewness of the Brazilian and Mexican 
distributions, vis-à-vis that of the United States. 
 
Figure 1: Urban Lorenz Curve For Brazil, México and the U.S.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Percentiles
% USA - 1999
Mexico - 1994
Brazil - 1999
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). In what follows, we use the three common measures of that family of 
P(0) P(1) P(2) Poverty line
1
P(0) P(1) P(2) Poverty line
1
Brazil 29,18 12,10 6,74 83,69 Brazil 22,33 8,40 4,37 83,69
Mexico 23,29 8,02 3,84 83,69 Mexico 6,66 1,52 0,51 83,69
USA 1,41 0,75 0,54 83,69
Brazil 30,02 12,22 6,82 84,27 Brazil 26,74 10,42 5,55 95,51
Mexico 17,86 5,59 2,57 70,11 Mexico 14,98 3,73 1,39 110,46
USA 25,02 10,19 5,92 687,70
FGT(α ) measures for Urban and Rural areas FGT(α ) measures for Urban areasWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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Figure 2: Income Distributions for Brazil, Mexico and The United States
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Sources: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000, ENIGH 1994
Note: Gaussian Kernel Estimates (with optimal window width) of the density functions for the distributions of the logarithms of household 
per capita incomes. The distribution were scaled so as to have the Brazilian mean. Brazil and Mexico are urban areas only. Incomes were 
converted to US dollar at PPP exchange rates.
Finally, Table 3 reports on standard decompositions of E(0), E(1) and E(2) by population 
subgroups
15, computing the RB statistic developed by Cowell and Jenkins (1995). This 
statistic is an indicator of the relative importance of each attribute used to partition the 
population, in the process of "accounting for" the inequality. The idea is that the larger the 
share of dispersion which is between groups defined by some attribute - rather than within 
those groups - the more likely it is that something about the distribution of or returns to that 
attribute are causally related to the observed inequality. The attributes to be used include 
education of the household head (or main earner for the distribution of household incomes); 
his or her age; his or her race or ethnic group; his or her gender; as well as the location of 
the household (both regional and rural/urban) and its size or type. 
 
The results are suggestive. In Brazil, education of the head is clearly the most important 
partitioning characteristic, followed by race and family type. In the US, family type 
dominates, with education a surprisingly low second, and age of head third. In Mexico, 
education and urban/rural vie for first place, with family type third. It is clear that education 
accounts for more inequality in Brazil (and Mexico) than in the US, although this technique 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
poverty indices : P(0), the headcount, P(1), the poverty gap and P(2), the cumulated squared gap. 
15 See Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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can not tell us whether this is due predominantly to different returns or different 
endowments of education – i.e. a different distribution of the population across educational 
levels. The greater role of the urban/rural partition in Mexico is in line with our findings 
regarding total and urban poverty rates there. Strikingly little of overall US inequality is 
between different regions of the country, reinforcing the widespread perception of a well-
integrated economy. This is in contrast to the two Latin American countries, where some 
10% of the Theil-L is accounted for by the regional partition.
16 Finally, it is interesting to 
note that inequality between households headed by people of different races - which one 
would expect to be prominent in the US - is five to six times as large in Brazil. 
Table 3: Theil Decompositions of Inequality by Population Characteristics
RB(0) RB(1) RB(2) RB(0) RB(1) RB(2) RB(0) RB(1) RB(2)
Region 0,092 0,076 0,031 0,003 0,004 0,003 0,113 0,103 0,050
Household Type 0,126 0,121 0,060 0,192 0,210 0,155 0,194 0,180 0,092
Urban / Rural 0,101 0,073 0,026 - - - 0,253 0,194 0,079
Gender of the Head 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,000
Race of the Head 0,137 0,119 0,051 0,024 0,024 0,016 - - -
Education Level 0,266 0,316 0,213 0,129 0,133 0,093 0,247 0,255 0,150
Age Group 0,051 0,047 0,021 0,082 0,091 0,066 0,042 0,037 0,017
Brasil Mexico USA
 
Note:  Entries reflect share of overall inequality which is between subgroups for each partition. See Cowell 
and Jenkins (1995). 
 
But although this is a useful preliminary exercise, there are at least three reasons why one 
would wish to go further. First, none of these decompositions control for any of the others: 
some of the inequality between regions in Mexico is also between individuals with different 
races, and there is no way of telling how much. Second, the decompositions are of scalar 
measures, and therefore “waste” information on how the entire distributions differ (along 
their support). Although some information can be recovered from knowledge of the 
different sensitivities of each measure, this is at best a hazardous and imprecise route. 
                                                           
16 The regional breakdowns used in this decomposition were standard for each country. Brazil was divided up 
into five regions: North, Northeast, Centre-West, Southeast and South. Mexico was divided up into nine 
regions: "Noroeste", "Noreste", "Norte", "Centro Occidente", "Centro", "Sur", "Sureste", "Suroeste" and 
"Distrito Federal". The US was broken down into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West. For a 
much more detailed analysis of the importance of regional effects in Mexican inequality, see Legovini, 
Bouillon and Lustig (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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Finally, even to the extent that one is prepared to treat inequality between subgroups 
defined by age or education, say, as being driven by those attributes – rather than by 
correlates – the share of total inequality attributed to that partition tells us nothing of 
whether it is the distribution of the characteristic (or asset), or the structure of its returns 
that matters. In the next section, we propose an alternative approach, which suffers from 
none of these shortcomings. 
 
3.  A General Statement of Statistical Decomposition Analysis. 
 
In order to understand the differences between two distributions of household incomes, 
f
A(y) and f
B(y), it seems natural to depart from the joint distributions ϕ
C(y, T), where T is a 
vector of observed household characteristics, such as family size, the age, gender, race, 
education and occupation of each individual member of the household, etc.. The superscript 
C (= A, B) denotes the country. Because a number (but not all) of the characteristics in T 
clearly depend on others (e.g. family size, via the number of children, will vary with the age 
and education of the parents), it will prove helpful to partition T = [V, W] where, for any 
given household h in C, each element of Vh may be thought of as logically depending on 
Wh, and possibly on some other elements of Vh, but Wh is to be considered as fully 
exogenous to the household. 
 
The distribution of household incomes, f
C(y), is of course the marginal distribution of the 
joint distribution ϕ
C(y, T) :  () ∫∫∫ = dT T y y f
C C , ) ( ϕ . It can therefore be rewritten as 
() () () dVdW W V W V y g y f
C C C , , φ ∫∫∫ = , where g
C(y | V,W) denotes the distribution of y 
conditional on V and W, and φ
C(V, W) is the joint distribution on all elements of T in 
country C. Given the distinction made above between the “semi-exogenous”
17 household 
characteristics V and the “truly exogenous” characteristics W, this can be further rewritten 
as: 
(1)  () () () () () () dW W W v h W V v h W V v h W V y g y f
C C C C C C ψ υ υ ... , , , 2 , 1 2 2 1 1 1 − − ∫∫∫ =  
                                                           
17 This terminology is motivated by the fact that we do not pretend that our models of V should be interpreted 
causally, and make no claims to be endogenizing these variables in a behavioural sense. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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In (1), the joint distribution of all elements of T = [V,W] has been replaced by the product 
of  υ  conditional distributions and the joint distribution of all elements in W, ψ
C(W). Each 
conditional distribution hn is for an element of V, conditioning on the υ -n elements of V not 
yet conditioned on, and on W. The order n = {1,…υ ) obviously does not matter for the 
product of the conditional distributions. (1) is an identity, invariant in that ordering. 
However, the order does matter for the definition of each individual conditional distribution 
hn(vn|V-1,…,n, W), and therefore for the interpretation of each decomposition defined 
below.
18  
 
Once we have written the distributions of household incomes for countries C = A, B as in 
(1), one could investigate how f
B(y) differs from f
A(y) by replacing some of the observed 
conditional distributions in the ordered set k
A = {g
A, h
A} by the corresponding conditional 
distributions in the ordered set k
B = {g
B,  h
B}. Each such replacement generates a 
counterfactual (ordered) set of conditional distributions k
s, the dimension of which is υ +1, 
(like k
A and k
B) whose elements are drawn either from k
A or k
B. It is now possible to define 
a counterfactual distribution f
s
A→ B(y; k
s, ψ
A) as the marginal distribution that arises from 
the integration of the product of the conditional distributions in k
s and the joint distribution 
function ψ
A(W), with respect to all elements of W. As an example, the counterfactual 
distribution f
s
A→ B(y; g
A, h1
B, h-1
A, ψ
A) is given by: 
() () () () () () dW W W v h W V v h W V v h W V y g y f
A A A B A s
B A ψ υ υ ... , , , 2 , 1 2 2 1 1 1 − − → ∫∫∫ = . The number of 
possible such counterfactual distributions is the number of possible combinations of 
elements of the set k, i.e. the dimension of its sigma-algebra.
19  
 
                                                           
18 Shorrocks (1999) proposes an algorithm based on the Shapley Value in order to calculate the correct 
"average" contribution of a particular hn( ) or of g( ), over the set of possible orderings, to the overall 
difference across the distributions. Rather than constructing these values in this paper, we present our results 
by showing a number of different orderings explicitly in Sections 5 and 6 below. 
19 When we turn to the empirical implementation of these counterfactual distributions, we will see that is also 
possible, of course, to simulate replacing the joint distribution ψ
A(y) by a non-parametric approximation of 
ψ
B(y). Depending on how each specific conditional distribution is modelled, it is also possible to have more 
than one counterfactual distribution per element of k. These matters pertain more properly to a discussion of 
the empirical application of the approach, however, and we return to them later. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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For each counterfactual distribution, it is possible to decompose the observed difference in 
the income distributions for countries A and B as follows: 
 
(2)      () () () () [ ] () () [ ] y f y f y f y f y f y f
s B A s A B − + − = −  
 
where the first term on the right-hand side measures the “explanatory power” of 
decomposition s, and the second term measures the “residual” of decomposition s.
20 Since 
these are differences in densities, they can be evaluated for all values of y. Furthermore, 
any functional of a density function can be evaluated for f
A, f
B or f
s, and similarly 
decomposed, according to its own metric.  
 
So, we have the same decomposition relationship  as (2) for the cumulative distribution 
() () ∫ =
y
C C dx x f y F
0
. Likewise, for the mean income of quantile q: 
() ()
()
()
∫
+
−
−
=
1
1
1
1
q F
q F
C C
q
C
C
dy y yf
Q
y µ , we have:  
(3)   () () () () [ ] () () [ ] y y y y y y
s
q
B
q
A
q
s
q
A
q
B
q µ µ µ µ µ µ − + − = −  
And we have analogous decompositions for any inequality measure I(f(y)) or poverty 
measure P(f(y); z).  In the applications discussed in Sections 5 and 6, the results are 
presented exactly in this form: Tables 5 and 7 contain inequality and poverty measures, 
evaluated for f
A(y), f
B(y) and for a set of counterfactual distributions f
s(y), so that the reader 
can make his own subtractions. Figures 4-8 and 10-14 plot the differences in the (log) mean 
income of “hundredths” q ∈  [1, 100], in a graphical representation of Equation (3). In 
recognition of their parentage, we call these the Generalized Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions. 
 
 
                                                           
20 A decomposition is defined (by (2)) with respect to a unique counterfactual distribution s, and is thus also 
indexed by s. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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4.  The Decompositions in Practice: A Specific Model 
 
The essence of the approach outlined above is to compare two actual income distributions, 
by means of a sequence of “intermediate” counterfactual distributions. These are 
constructed by replacing one or more of the underlying conditional distributions of A by 
those imported from B. In practice, this requires generating statistical approximations to the 
true conditional distributions. This may be done either through parametric models - 
following the tradition of Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973) and Almeida dos Reis and Paes de 
Barros (1991) - or through non-parametric techniques – as in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996).
21 Because of the direct economic interpretations of the parameter estimates in our 
approximated distributions, we find it convenient in this paper to follow (mainly) the 
parametric route, by approximating each of the true conditional distributions through a set 
of standard econometric models, with pre-imposed functional forms.
22  
 
In particular, we will find it convenient to propose two (sets of) models:  
(4)  y = G (V, W, ε ; Ω ) and 
(5)  V = H (W, η ; Φ ), 
where Ω  and Φ  are sets of parameters and ε  and η  stand for vectors of random variables, 
with ε⊥ {V, W}, and η⊥ W, by construction. G and H have pre-imposed functional forms. 
We can then write an approximation f
*(y) to the true marginal distribution f
C(y) in Equation 
(1) as: 
(1’)  () () ()
()
()
() ∫∫
= Ω= Φ
Ψ








=
y W V G
C
V W H
v y C dW W d d y f
; , ,, ,
*
εη
η η π ε ε π  
where  π
y(ε ) is the joint probability distribution function of ε  and π
v(η ) is the joint 
probability distribution function of η . 
 
                                                           
21 Although, as noted earlier, these authors too rely on parametric approximations to some conditional 
distributions, such as the probit for the conditional distribution of union status on individual characteristics. 
22 This is an advantage of our approach vis-à-vis, for instance, the hazard-function estimators of Donald et. al. 
(2000), who "note that the estimates of the hazard function for wages, earnings or incomes are difficult to 
interpret" (p.616) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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Just as an exact decomposition was defined by (2) for each true counterfactual distribution, 
we can now define the (actually operational) decomposition s in terms of the approximated 
distributions f 
*(y), as follows: 
 
(2’)  () () () () [ ] () () [ ] () () [ ] y f y f y f y f y f y f y f y f
s s s B A s A B * * − + − + − = − .  
 
Recall that a counterfactual distribution s is conceptually given by f
s
A→ B(y; k
s, ψ
A), and is 
thus defined by (ψ
A and) the simulated sequence of conditional distributions k
s, which 
consists of some original distributions from A, and some imported from B. Analogously, an 
approximated distribution  ()
A s s s
B A y f Ψ Φ Ω → , , ;
*  is defined with respect to (ψ
A and) the two 
sets of simulated parameters Ω
s and Φ
s, which consist of some original parameters from the 
models estimated for country A, and some imported from the models estimated for country 
B.  
 
The last term in (2') gives the difference between the approximated and the true 
counterfactual distribution We therefore call it the approximation error and denote it by RA. 
Clearly, how useful this decomposition methodology is in gauging differences between 
income distributions depends to some extent on the relative size of the approximation error. 
The applications in the next two sections illustrate that it can be surprisingly small. 
 
Following from (1’), our statistical model of household incomes has three levels. The first 
corresponds to model G (V, W, ε ;  Ω ), which seeks to approximate the conditional 
distribution of household incomes on observed characteristics: g(y| V,W).  This level 
generates estimates for the parameter set Ω , which we associate with the structure of 
returns in the labor markets and with the determination of the occupational structure in the 
economy. The second level corresponds to model H (W, η ; Φ ) which seeks to approximate 
the conditional distributions hn(vn|V-1,…,n, W), for V ={number of children in the household 
(nch); years of schooling of individual i (Eih); and total household non-labor income (y0h)} 
In the third level, we investigate the effects of replacing ψ
A(W) with a (non-parametric) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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estimate of ψ
B(W). This largely corresponds to the racial and demographic make-up of the 
population. 
 
First-level model G (V, W, ε ; Ω ) is given by equations (6-8) below. Household incomes are 
an aggregation of individual earnings yhi, and of additional, unearned income such as 
transfers or capital income, y0. Per capita household income for household h is given by: 
(6)       





+ Ι = ∑∑
==
0
11
1
y y
n
y
h
hi hi
n
i
J
j
j j
h
h  
where 
j
hi I  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if individual i in household h 
participates in earning activity j, and 0 otherwise. The allocation of individuals across 
activities (i.e. labor force participation and the occupational structure of the economy) is 
modeled through a multinomial logit of the form: 
(7)       {}
∑
≠
+
= = =
s j
Z Z
Z
hi
s
j hi s hi
s hi
e e
e
Z P s j
λ λ
λ
λ ) , ( Pr    
where P
s( ) is the probability of individual i in household h being in occupational category 
s, which could be: inactivity, formal employment in industry, informal employment in 
industry, formal employment in services or informal employment in services. Separate but 
identically specified models are estimated for males and females. The vector of 
characteristics Z ⊂  T is given by Z = {1, age, age squared, education dummies, age 
interacted with education, race, and region for the individual in question; average 
endowments of age and education among adults in his or her household; numbers of adults 
and children in the household; whether the individual is the head or not; and if not whether 
the head is active}.  
 
As is well known, the multinomial logit model may be interpreted as a utility-maximizing 
discrete choice model where the utility associated with choice j is given by 
Uj
hi j hi
j
hi Z U ε λ + = . . The last term stands for unobserved choice determinants of individual 
i, and it is assumed to be distributed according to a double exponential law in the 
population. We prefer, however, not to insist on this utility-maximizing interpretation of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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multi-logit and to treat it merely as a building block of the statistical model G, defined in 
equation (4). 
 
Turning to the labor market determination of earnings,
j
hi y  in (6) is assumed to be log-linear 
in α j and β j, and the individual earnings equation is estimated separately for males and 
females, as follows: 
(8)       i j hi j
j
hi y ε β α + + = x log  
where x ⊂  T is given by x = {education dummies, age, age squared, age * education, and 
intercept dummies for region, race, sector of activity and formality status}. In the absence 
of specific information on experience, the education and age variables are the standard 
Becker - Mincer human capital terms. The racial and regional intercept dummies allow for 
a simple level effect of possible spatial segmentation of the labor markets, as well as for the 
possibility of racial discrimination. Earning activities are defined by sector and formality 
status. To simplify, it is assumed that earnings functions across activities also differ only 
through the intercepts, so that the sets of coefficients β j are the same across activities (β j = 
β ). We interpret these β  coefficients in the usual manner: as estimates of the labor market 
rates of return on the corresponding individual characteristics. 
 
This first level of the methodology generates estimates for the set Ω , comprising 
occupational choice parameters λ , and (random) estimates of the residual terms 
Us
hi ε
23, as 
well as for α j and β  and for the variance of the residual terms, 
2 2 , f m ε ε σ σ .   
 
In the second level of the model, H (W, η ; Φ ), we estimate the conditional distributions of 
V ={number of children in the household (nch); years of schooling of individual i (Eih); and 
total household non-labor income (y0h)} on W = {number of adults in the household (nah), 
its regional location (rh), individual age (Aih), race (Rih) and gender (gih)}. This is done by 
imposing the functional form associated with the multinomial logit (such as the one in 
Equation 7) on both the conditional distribution of Eih on W: MLE (E A, R, r, g, nah) and on 
                                                           
23 For details on how the latter may be determined, see Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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the conditional distribution of the number of children in the household on {E, W}: MLC 
(nch E, A, R, r, g, nah).  
 
Unlike Equation (7), these models are estimated jointly for men and women. The 
educational choice multilogit MLE has as choice categories 1-4; 5-6; 7-8; 9-12; and 13 and 
more years of schooling, with 0 as the omitted category. Estimation of this model generates 
estimates for the educational endowment parameters, γ . The demographic multilogit MLC 
has as choice categories the number of children in the household: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and more, 
with 0 as the omitted category. Estimation of this model generates estimates for the 
demographic endowment parameters, ψ . Finally, the conditional distribution of total 
household non-labor incomes on {E, W} is modelled as a Tobit: T (y E, A, R, r, g, nah).
24 
Estimation of this model generates estimates for the non-human asset endowment 
parameters, ξ . These three vectors constitute the set of parameters Φ ={γ , ψ , ξ }. 
 
After each of these reduced-form models has been estimated for two countries (Brazil and a 
comparator nation), the approximate decompositions in (2’) can be carried out. Each 
decomposition is based on the construction of one approximated counterfactual distribution 
()
A s s s
B A y f Ψ Φ Ω → , , ;
* , defined largely by which set of parameters in Ω
A and Φ
A is replaced 
by their counterparts in Ω
B and Φ
B. All of our results in the next two sections are presented 
in this manner. Tables 5 and 7, for example, list mean incomes, four inequality measures 
and three poverty measures for a set of approximated counterfactual distributions, denoted 
by the vectors of parameters which were replaced with their counterparts from B. Similarly, 
Figures 4-8 and 10-14 draw differences in log mean quantile incomes between actual and 
                                                           
24 We also experimented with an alternative approximation for the conditional distribution of non-labor 
incomes. This was a (non-parametric) rank-preserving transformation of the observed distribution of y0, 
conditional on earned incomes in each country. In practical terms, we ranked the two distributions by per 
capita household earned income 
h
h e n
y
y y
0 − = . If  ) ( e B y F p =  was the rank of household with income ye 
in country B, then we replaced 
B
op y  with the unearned income of the household with the same rank (by earned 
income) in country A, after normalizing by mean unearned incomes:  () 0
0) (
y
y
y
A
B A
op µ
µ
.  The results, which are 
available from the authors on request, were similar in direction and magnitude to those of the parametric 
exercise reported in the text. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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approximated counterfactual distributions, where these are denoted by the vectors of 
parameters which were replaced with their counterparts from B to generate them. 
 
As an example, consider line 4 of Table 5 (denoted “α , β , and σ
2”). It lists the mean income 
and the inequality and poverty measures calculated for the distribution obtained by 
replacing the Brazilian α  and β  in equation (8), with those estimated for the US; scaling up 
the variance of the residual terms ε i by the ratio of the estimated variance in the US to that 
of Brazil; and then predicting values of yih for all individuals in the Brazilian income 
distribution, given their original characteristics (ψ
A). The density function defined over this 
vector of predicted incomes is  ()
A s s s
B A y f Ψ Φ Ω → , , ;
*  for  {}
A A B B B s η λ σ β α , , , ,
2 = Ω  and Φ
s 
= Φ
A. 
 
Whenever 
s B Ω ∈ λ , individuals may be reallocated across occupations. This involves 
drawing counterfactual ε
U's from censored double exponential distributions with the 
relevant empirically observed variances.
25 The labor income ascribed to the individuals 
who change occupation (to a remunerated one) is the predicted value by equation (8), with 
the relevant vector of parameters, and with ε 's drawn from a Normal distribution with mean 
zero and the relevant variance. And when Φ
s ≠  Φ
A, so that the values of the years of 
schooling variable and/or the number of children in households may change, these changes 
are incorporated into the vector V, and counterfactual distributions are recomputed for the 
new (counterfactual) household characteristics. As the discussion in the next two sections 
will show, the interactions between these various simulations are often qualitatively and 
quantitatively important. The ability to shed light on them directly and the ease with which 
they can be interpreted are two of the main advantages of this methodology. 
 
The third and final level of the model consists of altering the joint distribution of the truly 
exogenous household characteristics, ψ
C(W). The set W is given by the age (A), race (R), 
gender (g) of each adult individual in the household, as well as by adult household size (nah) 
                                                           
25 The censoring of the distribution from which the unobserved choice determinants are drawn is designed to 
ensure that they are consistent with observed behaviour under the alternative vector λ . See Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Lustig (1998) for details.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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and the region where the household is located (r). Since these variables do not depend on 
other exogenous variables in the model, this estimation is carried out simply by re-
calibrating the population by the weights corresponding to the joint distribution of these 
attributes in the target country.
26   
 
In practice, this is done by partitioning the two populations by the numbers of adults in the 
household. To remain manageable, the partition is in three groups: households with a single 
adult; households with two adults; and households with more than two adults. Each of these 
groups is then further partitioned by the race (whites and non-whites) and age category (six 
groups) of each adult.
27 The number of household in each of these subgroups can be 
denoted 
C n
r a M
,
, , where a stands for the age category of the group, r for the race of the group, 
n for the number of adults in the household, and C for the country. If we are importing the 
structure from country A (population of households P
A) to country B (population of 
households P
B), we then simply re-scale the household weights in the sample for country B 
by the factor:  
(9)      
A
B
B n
r a
A n
r a n
r a P
P
M
M








=
,
,
,
,
, φ  
Results for this final level of simulations are reported in Tables 5 and 7 under the letter φ . 
 
5.  The Brazil-US Comparison. 
 
The decompositions described in the previous section were conducted for differences in 
distributions between Brazil in 1999 and the United States in 2000. The estimated 
coefficients for equations (7) and (8), as well as those for the multinomial logit models for 
the demographic and educational structures and the tobit model of the conditional 
distribution of non-labor incomes are included in Tables A1 – A5, in the Appendix. Table 4 
– at the end of the paper - presents the results for importing the parameters from the US into 
Brazil, in terms of means and inequality measures for the individual earnings distributions, 
                                                           
26 The spirit of this procedure is very much the same as in DiNardo et. al. (1996). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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separately for men and women. Table 5 displays analogous results for household per capita 
incomes, and includes also three poverty measures.
28 Figures 4 to 8 present the full picture, 
by plotting differences in log incomes between the distributions simulated in various steps 
and the original distribution, for each percentile of the new distribution.
29  
 
Looking first at individual earnings, the observed differences between the Gini coefficients 
in Brazil and the US are nine points for men, and ten for women. Brazil's gender-specific 
earnings distributions have a Gini of 0.5, whereas those of the US are around 0.4. Roughly 
speaking, price effects (identified by simulating Brazilian earnings with the US α and β 
parameters) account for half of this difference. As we shall see, this is a much greater share 
than that which will hold for the distribution of household incomes per capita. Among the 
different price effects, the coefficient on the interaction of age and education stands out as 
making the largest difference.  
 
Differences in participation behavior are unimportant in isolation. Importing the US 
participation parameters only contributes to reducing Brazilian earnings inequality when 
combined with importing US prices, as may be seen by comparing the rows α ,β  (viii) and 
the row λ ,α ,β . Educational and fertility choices are more important effects. The former 
raises educational endowments and hence both increases and upgrades the sectoral profile 
of labor supply. The latter leads to increased participation rates by women. This effect 
accounts for nearly all of the remaining four to five Gini points. As one would expect, 
demographic effects are particularly important for the female distribution, where, in 
combination with the effect of education, it reduces the Brazilian Gini by a full five points 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
27 In the case of households with more than two adults, this is done for two adults only: the head and a 
randomly drawn other adult. In this manner, the group of single adult households is partitioned into 12 sub-
groups, and the other two groups into 144 sub-groups each. 
28 In order for the poverty comparisons to make sense across two countries as different as the US and Brazil, 
the US earnings distributions were scaled down so as to have the Brazilian mean. This was done by 
appropriately adjusting the estimate for α
US, as can be seen from the means reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Accordingly, counterfactual poverty measures are not reported for simulations which do not include an α  
estimate. The same procedure was used in Section 6, to rescale the Mexican earnings distributions to have the 
Brazilian means. 
29 Analogous figures for differences in log incomes by percentiles ranked by the original distribution – which 
show the re-rankings induced by each simulation - are available from the authors on request.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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even before any changes are made to prices. Reweighing the purely exogenous 
endowments - including race - has no effect. 
 
Table 5, which reports on the simulations for the distribution of household incomes per 
capita, can be read in an analogous way. The first two lines present inequality and poverty 
measures for the actual distributions of household per capita income by individuals in 
Brazil (in 1999) and the US (in 2000). In terms of the Gini coefficient, the gap we are 
trying to "explain" is substantial: it is twelve and a half points higher in Brazil than in the 
US. The difference is even larger when the entropy inequality measures E() are used.  
 
 
     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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The first block of simulations suggests that differences in the structure of returns to 
observed personal characteristics in the labor market can account for some five of these 
thirteen points.
30 When one disaggregates by individual βs, it turns out that returns to 
education, conditionally on experience – as for individual earnings - play the crucial role.  
 
Overall, it can thus be said that difference in returns to schooling and experience together 
explain approximately 40 per cent of the difference in inequality between Brazil and the 
US.  The order of magnitude is practically the same with E(1) and E(2) but it is higher with 
E(0), suggesting that the problem is not only that returns to schooling are relatively higher 
at the top of the Brazilian schooling scale but also that they are relatively lower at the 
bottom. This is confirmed by the fact that importing US prices lowers poverty in Brazil, 
even though (relative) poverty is initially comparable in the two countries.  
 
Importing the US variance of residuals goes in the opposite direction, contributing to an 
increase of almost 1.5 Gini points in Brazilian inequality.
31 Two candidate explanations 
suggest themselves: either there is greater heterogeneity amongst US workers along 
unobserved dimensions (such as ability) than among their Brazilian counterparts, or the US 
labor market is more efficient at observing and pricing these characteristics. This is an 
interesting question, which deserves further investigation. In the absence of additional 
information on, say, the variance of IQ test results or other measures of innate ability, 
orthogonal to education, we are inclined to favor the second interpretation. It may be that 
the lower labor market turnover and longer tenures that characterize the US labor market 
translate into a lessened degree of asymmetric information between workers and managers 
in that country, with a more accurate remuneration of endowments which are unobserved to 
researchers. We thus consider the σ
2 effect as a price effect, which dampens the overall 
contribution of price effects to some 3.5 to 4 points of the Gini. 
 
                                                           
30 The relative importance of each effect varies across the four inequality measures presented, but the orders 
of magnitude are broadly the same, and the main story could be told from any of them. All are presented in 
Table 5, but we use the Gini for the discussion in the text. 
31 This result is in line with the earlier findings of Lam and Levinson (1992), who noted that the variance of 
residuals from earnings regressions such as these was considerably higher in the US than in Brazil. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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The next block shows that importing the US occupational structure (λ ) by itself, has almost 
no impact on Brazilian inequality, but lowers average incomes and raises poverty. This is a 
consequence of the great differences in the distribution of education across the two 
countries, as revealed by Figure 3 below. Since education is negatively correlated with 
inactivity, and positively with employment in industry and with formality in the US, when 
we simulate participation behavior with US parameters but Brazilian levels of education, 
we withdraw a non-negligible number of people from the labor force, and 'downgrade' 
many others. Figure 5 shows the impoverishing effect of imposing US occupational choice 
behavior, combined with its price effect, on Brazil's original distribution of endowments. 
 
Turning to the second-level model, H(W, η ,  Φ ), we see further support for the 
aforementioned role of education in determining occupational choice. When US 
educational parameters are imported by themselves, this raises education levels in Brazil 
substantially, thus significantly increasing incomes and reducing poverty. Education 
endowments increase more for the poor (as expected by the upper-bounded nature of the 
education distribution), and inequality also falls dramatically. The γ simulation alone takes 
six points of the Gini off the Brazilian coefficient and, crucially, takes the impoverishing 
effect away from the occupational structure simulation. The latter result suggests that the 
most important difference in the distribution of educational endowments between Brazil 
and the US might actually be in the lack of minimum compulsory level in Brazil – see 
figure 3.  
 
At this stage, it might seem that almost all of the difference in inequality between the US 
and Brazil is explained by education-related factors. Six points of the Gini are explained by 
the differences in the distribution of education and five points by the difference in the 
structure of earnings by educational level (that is, the coefficients of the earning functions). 
Yet, when these changes  - i.e. α , β  and γ  - are simulated together, as in row 8a in table 5, it 
turns out that their overall effect is not  the sum of the two effects (eleven points), but only 
eight points. The two education-related effects, distribution and earnings structure,  are 
therefore far from being additive. The same is true of the decomposition of earnings 
inequality in Table 6. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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The explanation for this non-additivity property is straight-forward. As can be seen in 
figure 3, only a tiny minority of US citizens have fewer than 9 years of education, whereas 
practically 60% of the Brazilian population do. At the same time, the structure of US 
earnings for the few people below that minimum level of schooling is approximately flat, 
possibly because of minimum wage laws. In Brazil, on the contrary, earnings are strongly 
differentiated over that range. People with less than full primary education earn on average 
70% of the mean earnings of people with some secondary education.
32 This proportion is 
95 per cent for the few people with such a low level of schooling in the US. Thus, 
importing the earnings structure from the US to Brazil contributes to a drastic equalization 
of the distribution when the demographic structure of education of Brazil remains 
unchanged. Many people with less than secondary education are then paid at practically the 
same rate as people with completed secondary.  
 
Doing the same exercise with the US demographic structure of education has much less 
effect, because there are very few people in that country with less than secondary. This 
appears clearly in table 5 when comparing rows 1 and 3 on the one hand, and rows 8 and 8a 
on the other. The basic effect of switching to US earnings when the US demographic 
educational structure is used comes from the fact that the relative earnings of college versus 
high school graduates is substantially higher in Brazil.  
 
The question which remains is: how much of the excess inequality in Brazil with respect to 
the US is due to the distribution of education, and how much is due to the structure of  
schooling returns.
33 The foregoing argument makes it tempting to place greater weight on 
the  distribution of education effect. This is because the structure of educational returns at 
low schooling levels is relevant to very few people in the US, and yet it has such an 
important effect when imported to Brazil. One may also hold that the structure of returns 
actually reflects the educational profile of both populations. There are positive returns at the 
                                                           
32 These figures refer to mean earnings by educational level and differ from what may be inferred from the 
regression coefficients for schooling in table A2. 
33 This is not a new question. In fact, it was at the heart of the public debate about the causes of increasing 
inequality in Brazil during the 1960s. See Fishlow (1972) and Langoni (1973) for different views on the 
matter at that time. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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bottom in Brazil because many people in the labor force have zero or a very low level of 
schooling, whereas this is exceptional in the US. There are also larger returns in Brazil at 
the top of  the schooling range because there are relatively fewer people with a college 
education. 
Figure 3: Distribution of education across the countries
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Sources: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000, ENIGH 1994 
 
Moving on to demographic behavior, we observe a similar role for education. As with 
occupational structure, importing ψ alone hardly changes inequality – it would even 
increase it slightly. However, fertility is negatively correlated with educational attainment, 
particularly of women. If the change in fertility were taking place in the Brazilian 
population with US levels of schooling and participation behavior, inequality would drop 
by 1 percentage point of the Gini coefficient and poverty would fall. This seems to mean 
that fertility behavior differs between the two countries mostly for lowest educated 
households.  
 
When the effects of some of the “semi-exogenous” endowments (embodied in the 
approximations to the educational and demographic counterfactual conditional 
distributions) are combined with occupational structure and price effects (as in the row for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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ψ, λ, γ α, β, σ
2), we see an overall reduction of seven points in the Gini. Most of this 
(around five points) seems to be associated with adopting the US endowments of education, 
either directly or indirectly, through knock-on effects on participation and fertility. The 
remainder is due to the price effects.
34 This still leaves, however, some additional five Gini 
points - a rather substantial amount - in the difference in inequality between the two 
countries unexplained. Figure 7 illustrates the results of the combined simulations for the 
entire distribution: while the simulated line has moved much closer to the actual (log 
income percentile) differences, it is not yet a very good fit. 
 
Of the various candidate factors we are considering, two remain: the differences in the joint 
distributions of exogenous observed personal endowments: ψ
A(W) and ψ
B(W); and non-
labor incomes. The two final blocks of simulations show that it is the latter, rather than the 
former, that accounts for the remaining inequality differences. While reweighing the 
households in accordance with Equation (9) actually has an increasing effect on Brazilian 
inequality (see line 21) - thus weakening the explanatory power of the overall simulation by 
about one and half Gini points - importing the conditional distribution of non-labor incomes 
has a surprisingly large explanatory power. As may be seen from line 20 of Table 5, it 
actually moves the simulated Gini coefficient for Brazil to within 1.7 Gini point of the true 
US Gini.  
 
When reweighing the joint distributions of exogenous observed personal endowments is 
combined with all the previous steps, in line 23, the difference is further reduced to 1.3 Gini 
points It also does remarkably well by all other inequality measures in Table 5.  Figure 8 
shows the simulated income differences for two different counterfactual distributions with 
non-labor incomes - one with and the other without reweighing. The fit with regard to the 
actual differences is clearly much improved with respect to the preceding simulations, and 
it is evident that reweighing the exogenous endowments has a limited effect. The fact that 
the curve for simulated income differences now lies much nearer the actual differences 
                                                           
34  This allocation of the various effects is made difficult by the fact that their size depends on the other effects 
already being accounted for. The figures mentioned here are obtained as averages over the various possible 
configurations appearing in table 5.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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curve graphically illustrates the success of the simulated decomposition. This suggests that 
the approximation error RA is very small, at least in this application. 
 
In order to identify the relative importance of the various components of non-labor income, 
we considered the effect of each source separately.
35 Private transfers are responsible for a 
drop in the Gini coefficient equal to 0.7 percentage points, certainly not a negligible effect.  
But most of the effect of unearned income is in effect due to retirement income. Retirement 
income is strongly inequality-increasing in Brazil, whereas it would be (mildly) equalizing 
in the US.  This can be seen in Figure 9, which shows the mean retirement pension income 
for each hundredth of the distribution of household income. Apart for some outliers in the 
middle of the distribution, retirement income clearly concentrates among the richest 
households in Brazil, whereas it is the largest in the deciles just below the median in the 
US. The explanation of that difference is simple. Retirement income in Brazil concentrates 
among retirees of the formal sector who tend to be better off than the rest of the 
population.
36  In the US, on the contrary, retirees are more evenly distributed in the 
population. When summing up all income sources, they tend to be around the median of the 
distribution.  Hence the switch from Brazilian to US retirement income is very strongly 
equalizing, reflecting first of all the universality of retirement in the US and the privilege 
that it may represent in Brazil.  
 
Overall, the bottom line seems to be that differences in income inequality between Brazil 
and the United States are predominantly due to differences in the underlying distributions 
of endowments in the two countries, including among endowments the right to retirement 
income. Of the almost thirteen Gini points difference, almost ten can be ascribed to 
endowment effects. Among these, the data suggest almost equally important roles to 
inequalities in the Brazilian distribution of human capital (as proxied by years of 
schooling), and other claims on resources, measured by flows of non-labor income.   
                                                           
35 This analysis is available from the authors on request. 
36 See Hoffman (2001) for an interesting analysis of the contribution of retirement pensions to Brazilian 
inequality. His findings confirm the importance of this income source to the country's high levels of 
inequality, but he shows that this effect is particularly pronounced in the metropolitan areas of the poorer 
Northeastern region, as well as in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo. The effect 
appears to be much weaker in rural areas. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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The remaining three points of the Gini are due to price effects and, in particular, steeper 
returns to education in Brazil than in the US. Combined to the more unequal distribution of 
educational endowments themselves, this confirms the importance of education (prices and 
quantities) in driving Brazilian inequality, as previewed by the Theil decompositions 
reported in Section 2. While human capital remains firmly at the center-stage, our results 
suggest that it is joined there by the distribution of non-labor incomes and, in particular, of 
post-retirement incomes. 
 
Figure 9: Incidence of Retirement Pensions in Brazil and the US
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Sources: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 
 
6.  The Brazil - Mexico Comparison 
 
The differences between the distributions of household income per capita in Brazil and 
Mexico are much smaller than those between either country and the US. The two Latin 
American countries are at roughly the same level of development, and both are high 
inequality countries in international terms. Nevertheless, urban Brazil is much poorer than 
urban Mexico, and more unequal by any of the four measures reported in Table 7 below. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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The Lorenz curve for urban Brazil, in Figure 1, lies everywhere below Mexico's. The 
estimated coefficients for equations (7) and (8), run now so as to be strictly comparable 
between Brazil and Mexico, as well as those for the multinomial logit models for the 
demographic and educational structures, are included in Tables A6 – A9, in the Appendix. 
 
In terms of the Gini coefficient, Brazil's excess inequality amounts to some seven points. 
Price effects account for 1.2 of these, with the variance of the residuals making no 
contribution at all to differences between Mexico and Brazil. Participation behavior and 
occupational structure also account for about a Gini point, but its interaction with the price 
effects is more-than-additive. The combined impact of all price and participation effects is 
of more than three points of the Gini.  
 
Education alone also accounts for some three Gini points, but its interaction with 
occupational choice and price effects is less-than-additive. Joint simulation of Mexican λ, γ, 
α, β and σ
2 account for some four and a half of the seven-point difference. Interacting 
demographic effects takes away another Gini point from Brazil's measure, but again only 
once the Mexican approximated conditional distribution of education has been imported 
too. As in the case of the US, the educational structure of the population seems to be, either 
directly or indirectly, a powerful explanatory factor of the difference in household income 
distribution between Brazil and Mexico.  
 
Replacing ψ
A(W) by ψ
B(W) - i.e. reweighing the Brazilian population so that its make-up 
in terms of exogenous characteristics such as age, race and household type is the same as 
Mexico's - has a small inequality-reducing effect: the Gini coefficient falls by 0.7 
percentage point. This effect is slightly bigger when these new exogenous endowments are 
interacted with Mexican (“semi-exogenous” endowments of) education and fertility, as well 
as its price and occupational choice effects.  They also help subtract a Gini point. 
 
Altogether, the preceding effects account for almost all the difference observed between 
Brazil and Mexico, in terms of the Gini coefficient. This is not true, however, of the other 
inequality measures or of poverty, as shown in table 7. In particular, it can be seen that very 
little of the excessive relative poverty in Brazil is explained by the decomposition William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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methodology, when it is limited to price, occupational structure and endowment effects, a 
feature that also appears quite clearly in Figure 12.  As in the comparison with the US, it 
may thus be expected that what is left unexplained actually corresponds to the factors 
behind unearned income. 
 
Unlike in Section 5, the conditional distribution of non-labor incomes in Mexico was 
approximated by a non-parametric method, described in footnote 18. As Figure 13 
illustrates, the impact of this approximation is powerfully equalizing. By itself, it subtracts 
four points from the Brazilian Gini, and six points from the headcount index (see row 16: 
ξ 0, in Table 7). Tellingly, it almost halves the distribution-sensitive poverty measure 
FGT(2). At the same time, it may also be seen that, when combined with all the preceding 
changes, importing the structure of Mexican unearned incomes overshoots the observed 
difference between the two countries – see also figure 13. This means that the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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approximation error RA for this decomposition is negative – and larger in module than in 
the previous section.
37  
 
In any case, however, the results obtained so far suggest that the Brazilian urban poor are at 
a disadvantage in terms of access to non-human assets and to public or private transfers 
when compared not only to their US counterparts - which might not be so surprising - but 
also when compared to the Mexican urban poor. This is an issue of clear relevance for the 
design of poverty-reduction policy in Brazil. Identifying more precisely the reasons of the 
difference with Mexico deserves further investigation. 
 
7.   Conclusions 
 
This paper proposed a micro-econometric approach to investigating the nature of the 
differences between income distributions across countries. Since a distribution of 
household incomes is the marginal of the joint distribution of income and a number of other 
observed household attributes, simple statistical theory allows us to express it as an integral 
of the product of a sequence of conditional distributions and a (reduced order) joint 
distribution of exogenous characteristics. Our method is then to approximate these 
conditional distributions by pre-specified parametric models, which can be econometrically 
estimated in each country. We then construct counterfactual approximated income 
distributions, by importing sets of parameter estimates from the models of country B into 
country A. This allows us to decompose the difference between the density functions 
(evaluated at any point) of the two distributions - or any of their functionals, such as 
inequality or poverty indices – into a term corresponding to the effect of the imported 
parameters, a residual term, and an approximation error. The decomposition residual can be 
reduced arbitrarily by combining the sets of parameters to be imported into a given 
simulation. The approximation error is shown to be small for the applications considered. 
                                                           
37 In addition, the Brazil - Mexico decompositions appear, on the whole, to be less additively separable than 
the Brazil - US ones. The sum of individual effects in Table 7 is further away from the corresponding 
combined effects than in Table 5.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
  33
The sets of counterfactual income distributions constructed in this paper were designed to 
decompose differences across income distributions into effects due to three broad sources: 
differences in the returns or pricing structure prevailing in the countries' labor markets; 
differences in the parameters of the occupational structure of the economy; and differences 
in the endowments of age, race, gender, education, fertility and non-labor assets, broadly 
defined. By comparing the counterfactual distributions corresponding to each of these 
effects and to various combinations of them, we shed light on the nature of the inter-
relationships between returns, occupations, and the underlying distributions of 
endowments. These can lead to interesting findings, such as a quantification of the impact 
of educational expansion on inequality through a specific channel: its effect on women’s 
fertility behavior and labor force participation.  
We applied this approach to the question of what makes the Brazilian distribution of 
income so unequal. In particular, we considered the determinants of the differences 
between it and the distributions of two other large American nations: Mexico and the 
United States. We found that differences in the structure of occupations account for little in 
both cases. Prices were not insubstantial in explaining difference between the US and 
Brazil, with this being due largely to steeper returns to education in Brazil. But the most 
important source of Brazil's uniquely large income inequality is the underlying inequality in 
the distribution of its human and non-human endowments. In particular, the main causes of 
Brazil's inequality - and indeed of its urban poverty - seem to be poor access to education 
and claims on assets and transfers that potentially generate non-labor incomes.  
The importance of these non-labor incomes was one of our chief findings. Income 
distribution in Brazil would be much improved if only the distribution of this income 
component was more similar to those of the US or Mexico - themselves hardly paragons of 
the Welfare State. If this is due to public transfers, which needs to be investigated further, it 
is possible that our findings would vindicate those who have argued for a speedier public 
approach to the reduction in inequality than that which would be available from educational 
policies alone. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 478 
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Figure 4: Brazil - US Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita, 
Actual and Simulated, Steps 1 and 2
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Figure 5: Brazil - US Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 4
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Figure 6: Brazil - US Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 6
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Figure 7: Brazil - US Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 8
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Figure 8: Brazil - US Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita, 
Actual and Simulated
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Figure 10: Brazil - Mexico Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Steps 1 and 2
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Figure 11: Brazil - Mexico Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 4
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Figure 12: Brazil - Mexico Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 6
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Figure 13: Brazil - Mexico Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 8
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Figure 14: Brazil - Mexico Differences in the Logarithm of Household Income Per Capita,
 Actual and Simulated, Step 12
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